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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                         
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
                         I.  INTRODUCTION 
         Hyatt Corporation is the manager of a resort hotel on 
St. John in the U.S. Virgin Islands.  Hyatt's management powers 
arise from agreements executed in March 1990 among Hyatt, Great 
Cruz Bay Development Co., Inc. ("Great Cruz"), the owner of the 
hotel, and Great Cruz's lender, Saastopankkien Keskus-Osake- 
Pankki ("Skopbank").  After Skopbank foreclosed on the property 
in 1991, 35 Acres Associates purchased the hotel pursuant to a 
judicial sale.  Immediately thereafter, 35 Acres purported to 
terminate Hyatt's management of the hotel, propelling the parties 
into this acrimonious litigation.  The district court, on cross- 
motions for summary judgment, entered an order granting 35 Acres' 
motion for partial summary judgment on April 10, 1996, thus 
terminating Hyatt's presence at the hotel, and ordering the 
parties to "work together to effect a smooth transition in the 
management and operation of the Hotel."  The court certified its 
order as a final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) on 
May 3, 1996. 
         Hyatt now appeals from the district court's grant of 
partial summary judgment to 35 Acres.  The parties agree that 
this appeal focuses only on issues concerning 35 Acres' power to 
terminate Hyatt's agency and 35 Acres' right of possession of the 
hotel and related property together with issues relating to the 
transition of the management of the hotel.  The district court 
had subject matter jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(2) (action between citizens of a state and citizens or 
subjects of a foreign state) or 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3) (action 
between citizens of different states in which citizens or 
subjects of a foreign state are additional parties).  The amount 
in controversy exceeds $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs.  
We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and exercise plenary review over the grant of partial summary 
judgment and abuse of discretion review over the court's 
transition order. 
 
         II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
                      A. Factual Background 
         In view of the procedural posture of the case we 
present the facts in a light most favorable to Hyatt.  From June 
1988 through March 1990 Skopbank, a Finnish corporation, loaned 
Great Cruz and St. John Virgin Grand Villas Associates 
approximately $120 million for the construction and operation of 
the property which became known as the "Hyatt Regency St. John at 
the Virgin Grand Resort."  In 1989 representatives of Great Cruz 
approached Hyatt to enlist its assistance in addressing 
operational and financial problems of the resort.  Great Cruz 
sought a professional, experienced, and financially able hotel 
company with a strong global brand identity and a proven ability 
in the Caribbean to attract business, so that the resort's value 
and profitability could be maximized.   
         Specifically, Great Cruz proposed that the resort bear 
the "Hyatt" and "Hyatt Regency" registered trademarks and trade 
names; that the resort join the "Hyatt" chain and participate in 
Hyatt's comprehensive and proprietary chain-wide programs and 
services (including, without limitation, Hyatt's global 
reservations system; worldwide marketing, public relations, and 
advertising services; employee training programs; and home office 
and regional sales office convention, business, and promotion 
services); and that Hyatt manage the resort.  Great Cruz 
particularly sought the use of the prestigious "Hyatt" name and 
Hyatt's commitment to use its expertise to ensure the success of 
the resort.  With the encouragement of Skopbank, Great Cruz was 
looking for a company to maximize the economic potential of the 
resort. 
         Hyatt was reticent to commit the "Hyatt" and "Hyatt 
Regency" names to the resort because of the resort's historically 
poor performance, its financial structure, and the fact that the 
quality and consistency of service, facilities, and amenities 
provided by Great Cruz fell far below Hyatt's quality standards.  
Thus, Hyatt believed that there was substantial economic and 
reputational risk in allowing the resort to be known as a "Hyatt 
Regency." 
         During the negotiations leading to the execution of the 
agreements, Hyatt informed Great Cruz that the "Hyatt" and "Hyatt 
Regency" trademarks, service marks, and trade names were worth 
billions of dollars to Hyatt's owners and represented decades of 
time, effort, and financial risk.  Hyatt's reputation as a 
premier resort manager was nowhere higher than in the Caribbean, 
where it had established itself as the predominant chain.  
Moreover, Hyatt informed Great Cruz that, even with Hyatt's 
special knowledge of resort-building and its established 
relationships with customers and vendors, it would take three to 
five years from the opening of the resort under the Hyatt name to 
stabilize its operations and to begin to realize the full 
potential of the location so that Hyatt could derive the level of 
financial benefits justifying its participation.  Hyatt informed 
Great Cruz that it only would consider establishing the resort as 
a "Hyatt Regency" if Great Cruz agreed to conditions that would 
ensure Hyatt both the power to control the resort's business and 
an adequate share in the resort's long-term profits that Hyatt 
believed its contributions could generate. 
         Hyatt informed Great Cruz during these negotiations 
that it would not permit the hotel to be known as a "Hyatt" or 
"Hyatt Regency" or agree to the inclusion of the resort in its 
worldwide chain unless it also was given powers to protect its 
contributions to the resort.  Hyatt decided that it was 
absolutely necessary for it to have the power to control the 
quality of the resort facility as well as the quality of services 
provided by the hotel by assuming managerial and operational 
responsibilities for the resort.  Hyatt, Great Cruz, and Skopbank 
therefore agreed to structure their contracts deliberately and 
carefully to accomplish those objectives to protect Hyatt. 
         During the negotiations among Hyatt, Great Cruz, and 
Skopbank, Hyatt analyzed the resort's highly-leveraged financial 
structure and other issues associated with the resort's financial 
situation.  With such considerations in mind, Hyatt informed 
Great Cruz that it was willing to consider a financial structure 
whereby Hyatt invested time and effort and not seek a substantial 
portion of its normal management fees in exchange for an interest 
in the enterprise affording it a return on its investment, to be 
taken in the form of a long-term profit participation.  Thus, 
Hyatt explains that, in order "to protect the investments and 
property it would contribute as part of its undertaking to build 
the business of the Resort, [it] required an interest in the 
profits of the `Hyatt Regency St. John.'"  Br. at 15.  
Accordingly, Hyatt demanded and Great Cruz consented to a formula 
under which Hyatt potentially would receive a significant return 
on its investment.  Although, in Hyatt's assessment, the formula 
contained a low front-end fixed management fee, it also included 
a substantial back-end share of profits that the parties 
specifically designed to reflect Hyatt's "capital investment in 
the property," id., which included Hyatt's contribution of the 
difference between its typical market rate front-end fees and the 
fees applicable in this case. 
         Further, to protect its interests, Hyatt negotiated for 
and obtained a 30-year term for the management agreement between 
it and Great Cruz which the parties agreed could not be 
terminated except in strict compliance with its express 
termination provisions.  Hyatt explains that, given its 
substantial "capital investments" in the hotel and the time 
required to reap a return on its investments, it was not willing 
to assume the risk that Great Cruz (or a subsequent owner) could 
revoke and terminate the agreement for reasons, or on grounds, 
other than those set forth in the contracts.  Id.  Hyatt informed 
Great Cruz that it deemed its participation in the enterprise as 
the clear equivalent of a cash equity investment, and Great Cruz 
assented to Hyatt's approach to, and view of, the transaction. 
         In order to protect the proprietary nature of its 
management methods and to avoid confusion with respect to its 
trademarks and trade names, Hyatt also insisted on the power to 
restrict the owner's right to transfer the management agreement 
to successors or assigns.  Thus, to secure the performance of 
duties owed to Hyatt, section 15.2 of the management agreement 
gave it the right and power to block the owner's assignment to 
any assignee "`engaged in the management or operation . . . of a 
chain (that is, five [5] or more locations) of hotels or 
resorts.'"  Br. at 18.  Further, Hyatt agreed to add the resort 
to its worldwide hotel chain and agreed to provide its 
comprehensive and proprietary chain services to the resort.  Many 
of the services that Hyatt thus committed to contribute involved 
confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information. 
         The parties eventually reached an understanding and on 
March 9, 1990, Great Cruz, Skopbank, and Hyatt executed a series 
of agreements that allow Hyatt to manage and operate the hotel.  
The documents included a management agreement signed by Hyatt and 
Great Cruz giving Hyatt complete control over the operation of 
the hotel for a term of 30 years, essentially limiting the 
owner's right to terminate the agreement to poor performance by 
Hyatt.  (Management Agreement at §§ 2, 4.5; app. 1809, 1836).  In 
return for managing the hotel, Hyatt would receive a base fee of 
1.5 percent of gross revenue, as well as an incentive fee 
structured on positive cash flow.  Id. at 1829.  A letter 
agreement signed by Great Cruz and Hyatt directed Hyatt to pay 
Skopbank any sums due to Great Cruz under the management 
agreement.  Id. at 113.   
         Hyatt sets forth in its brief that in order "to secure 
its property interests and investments in the business it was to 
create as well as to secure the performance of certain duties 
owed to [it]," br. at 21-22, Great Cruz warranted and guaranteed 
Hyatt's continuous right to manage the resort for the duration of 
the term of the management agreement.  Specifically, Hyatt notes 
that section 7.5 of the agreement provides that "this Agreement 
shall not be subject to forfeiture or termination except in 
accordance with the provisions hereof," id. at 22; see app. at 
1795, and that "Hyatt shall be entitled to operate the Hotel for 
the Term, and Owner shall, at no expense to Hyatt, undertake and 
prosecute all appropriate actions, judicial or otherwise, 
required to assure such right of operation to Hyatt."  Br. at 22; 
see app. at 1860-61. 
         In addition, a subordination, non-disturbance, and 
attornment agreement set forth the rights of the parties should 
Skopbank foreclose its mortgage to Great Cruz.  This agreement 
included a warrant by Skopbank that the management agreement 
would remain undisturbed by any foreclosure or default and would 
continue in full force and effect as long as Hyatt was not in 
default.   (Subordination Agreement at §§ 2, 3; app. at 548). 
         In 1991, Skopbank filed a foreclosure action in the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands (Civ. No. 91-355) as a 
result of Great Cruz's default on the mortgages.  In 1992, during 
the pendency of the foreclosure suit, the Government Guarantee 
Fund of the Republic of Finland ("GGF") obtained a controlling 
interest in Skopbank as part of the Finnish government's bailout 
of the bank. 
         On February 21, 1995, the district court entered a 
consent judgment and put the hotel up for judicial sale.  On 
March 20, 1995, 35 Acres Associates, a Virgin Islands general 
partnership consisting of two Finnish corporations, purchased the 
hotel.  On March 21, 1995, counsel for 35 Acres wrote to Hyatt, 
stating that "GGF, Skopbank and 35 Acres Associates consider the 
Management Agreement between Hyatt Corporation ('Hyatt') and 
Great Cruz Bay Development Company, Inc. as void, terminated 
and/or expired."  Br. at 23; app. at 1401-02.  On June 8, 1995, 
35 Acres wrote again, advising Hyatt that it was in wrongful 
possession, and demanding that it surrender possession of the 
hotel: 
              The Hotel belongs to 35 Acres, not 
         Hyatt.  Hyatt is trespassing on the property.  
         35 Acres again demands that Hyatt immediately 
         surrender possession of the Hotel and all 
         associated real and personal property and 
         accounts and cooperate in an orderly transfer 
         to 35 Acres.  We will have a transition team 
         available on short notice. 
App. at 1407.  Hyatt, however, did not surrender possession of 
the hotel. 
                     B. Procedural History 
         GGF and Skopbank filed suit against Hyatt (Civil No. 
1995-49) on March 16, 1995, seeking a declaratory judgment 
finding Hyatt in breach of the management agreements and alleging 
various claims in tort and contract.  GGF and Skopbank, of 
course, sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring the management 
agreement terminated and thus giving it possession of the hotel.  
On November 8, 1995, GGF and Skopbank filed an amended complaint 
adding additional entities as plaintiffs, including 35 Acres.  On 
April 25, 1995, Hyatt sued 35 Acres (Civil No. 1995-68), and 
thereafter filed two amended complaints.  The second amended 
complaint, dated June 21, 1995, sought a judgment declaring the 
rights of the various parties under the management agreements, 
recovery for civil conspiracy, and punitive, compensatory, and 
consequential damages.  On June 21, 1995, the district court 
consolidated the two cases for trial. 
         At a hearing on November 17, 1995, the court took under 
advisement 35 Acres' motion to dismiss the second amended 
complaint in the Hyatt suit (Civil No. 1995-68) and denied 
without prejudice Hyatt's motion to strike and dismiss the GGF 
parties' first amended complaint in the GGF suit (Civil No. 
1995-49).  See Government Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 166 
F.R.D. 321, 323 (D.V.I. 1996).  Hyatt renewed its motion to 
strike and dismiss on December 22, 1995. 
         On January 8, 1996, the district court granted 35 
Acres' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint in the 
Hyatt suit.  See Government Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 1996 
WL 165008, at *6 (D.V.I. Jan. 8, 1996).  On January 3, 1996, 35 
Acres moved for partial summary judgment against Hyatt in the GGF 
suit, arguing that it was entitled to possession of the hotel as 
a matter of law.  On January 23, 1996, Hyatt moved to amend the 
court's order of January 8, 1996, to permit the filing of a third 
amended complaint in its suit. 
         On March 6, 1996, the district court held a hearing on 
the consolidated cases.  Ruling from the bench, the court granted 
35 Acres' motion for partial summary judgment, in effect granting 
it possession of the hotel.  The court directed the parties to 
work together on transferring management of the hotel.  App. at 
2157.  The court denied without prejudice Hyatt's motion to 
dismiss the first amended complaint in the GGF suit (Civil No. 
1995-49).  In the Hyatt suit (Civil No. 1995-68) the court denied 
Hyatt's motion to amend the court's order of January 8, 1996, and 
its motion to be permitted to file a third amended complaint.  
The court issued a written order implementing its March 6, 1996 
rulings on April 10, 1996.  The order stated that "[b]oth parties 
shall work together to effect a smooth transition in the 
management and operation of the Hotel," app. at 2199, and allowed 
Hyatt 10 days from the entry of the order to answer the first 
amended complaint in the GGF suit (Civil No. 1995-49) and assert 
any defenses and compulsory counterclaims thereto.  Id. at 2199- 
2200.  The court further ordered the Hyatt case (Civil No. 1995- 
68) closed and that all other pleadings filed thereafter should 
contain only the caption of the GGF suit (Civil No. 1995-49).  
Id. at 2200.   
         The court issued an opinion and order on April 10, 
1996, explaining its rulings from the bench on March 6, 1996.  
See Government Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 166 F.R.D. 321.  In 
the opinion the district court noted first that "35 Acres seeks a 
determination that its agency relationship with Hyatt has been 
terminated as a matter of law, and Hyatt must leave the 
premises," id., at 326, and then concluded that: 
              Applying the controlling law to the 
         undisputed facts of this case establishes 
         that the Management Agreement created a 
         revocable agency that ended once 35 Acres 
         gave notice of its termination.  As 
         terminated agent, Hyatt must leave the 
         premises and surrender control of the Hotel 
         to 35 Acres, its rightful owner. 
Id., at 327.  Hyatt's challenge to this conclusion is at the 
heart of its appeal. 
         On April 12, 1996, 35 Acres filed a motion for entry of 
an order seeking the transition of management provided for in the 
district court's grant of partial summary judgment.  On May 3, 
1996, the district court entered such an order and certified the 
order of April 10, 1996, and the order of May 3, 1996, 
effectuating the order of April 10, 1996, as final judgments 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  On May 6, 1996, Hyatt filed a 
notice of appeal from the district court's May 3, 1996 Rule 54(b) 
order which included an appeal from the April 10, 1996 order. 
Hyatt also filed an emergency motion in the district court to 
stay enforcement of the judgment without bond or, in the 
alternative, for a hearing to set the amount of the supersedeas 
bond pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62. 
         Following oral argument on May 9, 1996, the district 
court denied Hyatt's emergency motion for a stay.  See Government 
Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 1996 WL 308865, at *1 (D.V.I. May 
15, 1996).  The court thereafter entered a written order denying 
the motion and providing that Hyatt must comply with the order of 
May 3, 1996, by May 14, 1996. 
         On May 13, 1996, Hyatt filed an emergency motion in 
this court to stay enforcement of the district court's judgment 
pending appeal.  A single judge of this court granted the motion 
on a temporary basis until a panel could consider the matter.  On 
May 20, 1996, we granted Hyatt's motion to stay enforcement of 
the judgment pending appeal and accelerated the parties' briefing 
schedule.  We also directed that following completion of the 
briefing the case be listed before the earliest available panel.  
Finally, we remanded the case to the district court to fix the 
amount of the supersedeas bond pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 8(a), 
while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal. 
         On May 29, 1996, the district court held a hearing on 
the remand and required Hyatt to post two bonds, one in the 
amount of $2 million (to be posted by June 4, 1996), and the 
other in the amount of $11 million (to be posted by July 30, 
1996), for a total bond obligation of $13 million.  The district 
court also held that this court's stay "should not allow Hyatt to 
reopen the Hotel over the objections of 35 Acres Associates." 
         On June 3, 1996, Hyatt filed a motion in this court to 
set aside or modify the district court's order setting the amount 
of the supersedeas bonds.  On July 3, 1996, we granted Hyatt's 
motion, but only "to the extent" that we vacated "so much of the 
order of May 31, 1996, which precluded Hyatt from reopening the 
hotel over the objection of 35 Acres Associates."  We denied the 
motion to modify the order with respect to the bonds.  We 
understand that Hyatt has posted the bonds.  We, however, are 
uncertain as to whether the hotel is open. 
         The parties agree that this appeal focuses only on 35 
Acres' power to terminate the agency and its right to possession 
of the hotel and related property, as well as transition matters, 
irrespective of the ultimate result of the remaining litigation.  
Thus, we do not consider whether 35 Acres wrongfully terminated 
Hyatt's management rights.  We now address the merits of Hyatt's 
appeal. 
 
                        III.  DISCUSSION 
                      A.  Burdens of Proof 
         We dispose of Hyatt's first argument summarily.  Hyatt 
argues that 35 Acres had the burden of proving the revocability 
of Hyatt's agency as a matter of law in the district court, as 
well as the burden of proving that Hyatt did not have the right 
to occupy or possess the resort.  Hyatt asserts that the only 
evidence 35 Acres offered with respect to these two issues 
consisted of the following four allegations:  
         (1) 35 Acres is the owner of a hotel known as 
         the Virgin Grand Hotel on the island of St. 
         John, U.S. Virgin Islands; (2) Hyatt 
         Corporation purports to claim a right to act 
         as the managing agent of 35 Acres pursuant to 
         a Management Agreement dated March 9, 1990, 
         between Hyatt and Great Cruz Bay Development 
         Company, Inc.; (3) Skopbank, GGF, and 35 
         Acres sent a letter to Hyatt dated March 21, 
         1995, in which they stated that they 
         `consider' the Management Agreement `as void, 
         terminated and/or expired'; and (4) Hyatt 
         refuses to vacate the premises. 
Br. at 28-29 (some internal quotations omitted). 
         Hyatt argues that 35 Acres' motion for partial summary 
judgment thus attempted to "off-load its burden of proof upon 
Hyatt."  Br. at 29.  Hyatt asserts that 35 Acres failed to meet 
its burden of proving as a matter of law the following necessary 
elements of its claim for relief: (1) the revocability of Hyatt's 
agency; (2) the valid termination of that agency; and (3) the 
absence of any right of Hyatt to manage or occupy the resort. 
         We decline to treat this case as involving merely the 
burdens placed upon parties seeking summary judgment, and 
therefore will address fully the merits of the appeal considering 
the facts presented on the motion for partial summary judgment in 
the district court.  After all, the parties submitted extensive 
materials in the district court and we see no reason why we 
should not consider the record as developed. 
 
                       B.  Prima Facie Case 
         Hyatt's second argument, that 35 Acres failed to 
establish a prima facie entitlement to relief, likewise lacks 
substance.  Hyatt first notes that in ruling upon 35 Acres' 
motion for partial summary judgment, the district court applied 
Virgin Islands law, which provides that the "rules of the common 
law, as expressed in the restatements of the law . . . shall be 
the rules of decision in the courts of the Virgin Islands . . . 
in the absence of local laws to the contrary."  V.I. Code Ann. 
tit. 1, § 4 (1967).  Thus, the district court held that, "The 
Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958) is the governing law in 
this area."  Government Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 166 F.R.D. 
at 327. 
         Hyatt points out that the Restatement recognizes that 
there are two separate and distinct types of agencies: 
         The first type, often called `revocable' 
         agencies, may be revoked by the principal at 
         any time and for any reason.  See Restatement 
         (Second) of Agency, § 118 and Comment b.  The 
         second type, often called `irrevocable' 
         agencies, agency powers `given as security,' 
         or agencies `coupled with an interest,' may 
         not be terminated at the whim of the 
         principal, but may be terminated only `in 
         accordance with the agreement by which the 
         power was created.'  See Restatement (Second) 
         of Agency, § 139 and Comment a. 
Br. at 31.  Hyatt therefore argues that mere proof of the 
existence of a power in the form of an agency does not establish 
the absolute and unqualified right of the grantor to terminate 
the power.  Consequently mere evidence that there is an agency 
neither establishes the revocability of that agency nor disproves 
its irrevocability.  Id.  Hyatt thus claims that there was a 
"fundamental flaw in 35 Acres' motion for partial summary 
judgment" in the district court.  Id. at 32. 
         Further, Hyatt asserts that 35 Acres did not negate 
conclusively the continued existence of a principal-agent 
relationship with Hyatt.  Hyatt argues that a claim that an 
agency is irrevocable or is coupled with an interest is not an 
affirmative defense in an action to terminate an agency.  Thus, 
it contends that 35 Acres did not fulfill its burden on its 
motion for summary judgment seeking to terminate the agency 
merely by proving the existence of the agency.  Hyatt asserts 
that 35 Acres was required to demonstrate that Hyatt's agency was 
revocable, and thereby preclude the possibility that Hyatt's 
agency was irrevocable. 
         Along the same lines, Hyatt argues that 35 Acres failed 
to demonstrate as a matter of law that it terminated Hyatt's 
agency, as Hyatt claims that the letter of March 21, 1995 "does 
not clearly purport to constitute an act of revocation or 
termination, but suggests that the termination had already 
occurred and that the letter was merely memorializing that 
alleged historic fact."  Br. at 33.  Hyatt claims that the proof 
of 35 Acres' alleged termination of Hyatt's agency is, at best, 
ambiguous and inconclusive, and that courts frequently hold that 
the intent and effect of purported termination notices raise 
genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.  
Finally, Hyatt attacks the prima facie case presented by 35 Acres 
as devoid of conclusive proof of a present right in 35 Acres to 
exclusive possession of the resort. 
         We find this line of argument meritless, and are 
satisfied that 35 Acres met its burden in its motion for partial 
summary judgment of presenting a prima facie case that it was 
entitled to possession of the hotel as a matter of law.  SeeMatsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
585, n.10, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, n.10 (1986).  On the motion 35 
Acres presented the management agreement which on its face merely 
created an agency.  We see no reason for 35 Acres to have proven 
at that point in the litigation that the agency itself was not 
irrevocable.  As to Hyatt's claim that the March 21, 1995 letter 
"[did] not clearly purport to constitute an act of revocation or 
termination," the district court noted in its January 8, 1996 
memorandum that: 
         Hyatt concedes that 35 Acres sent it letters 
         that 35 Acres 'considered Hyatt's management 
         agreement "void, terminated and/or expired"' 
         and demanding Hyatt `immediately surrender 
         possession' of the Hotel.  (Second Amended 
         Complaint at 2.)  Indisputably, such letters 
         manifested 35 Acres' dissent to the 
         continuance of the agency relationship with 
         Hyatt -- all that is required for an agency 
         to be terminated under the Restatement.  
         Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 118. 
Government Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 1996 WL 165008 at *3.  
Surely, Hyatt cannot argue reasonably that it did not realize the 
March 21, 1995 letter constituted notice of termination, when it 
has referred to the letter as such in its own pleadings.  
Furthermore, on June 9, 1995, Hyatt filed an amended complaint 
referring to 35 Acres' June 8, 1995 letter to Hyatt that we 
quoted in part above which set forth continued written demands 
that Hyatt quit the property, provide an accounting, and cease 
acting as agent for 35 Acres because its agency had been 
terminated.  App. at 1170, 1180, 1034.  In addition, on June 21, 
1995, Hyatt filed a Second Amended Complaint that referenced a 
June 19, 1996 letter (app. at 1186, 1195) demanding that Hyatt 
cease acting as agent for 35 Acres.  App. at 1043. 
         Finally, Hyatt's argument that the prima facie case 
presented by 35 Acres was devoid of conclusive proof of 35 Acres' 
present right to exclusive possession of the resort is also 
meritless.  Hyatt has admitted that 35 Acres owns the hotel.  
App. at 390.  This argument deserves no further comment.  We 
proceed now to Hyatt's more substantial arguments. 
                   C.  The Agency Relationship 
         Hyatt's main argument is that the district court erred 
in granting judgment in favor of 35 Acres because Hyatt raised 
genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.  
First we will discuss the law applicable to the termination of 
agency agreements, and then we will consider Hyatt's specific 
arguments. 
                      1.  The Applicable Law 
         As the district court correctly noted, agency 
principles as expressed in the Restatements govern this case. 
Section 118 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958) states 
that an agent's "[a]uthority terminates if the principal or the 
agent manifests to the other dissent to its continuance."  
Comment (b) explains:  
         The principal has power to revoke . . . 
         although doing so is in violation of a 
         contract between the parties and although the 
         authority is expressed to be irrevocable.  A 
         statement in a contract that the authority 
         cannot be terminated by either party is 
         effective only to create liability for its 
         wrongful termination. 
         The only exception to the rule that principals may 
terminate an agency relationship at any time is when the 
authority granted to the agent is a "power given as security."  
Id. §§ 138, 139.  Section 138 of the Restatement states: 
         A power given as security is a power to 
         affect the legal relations of another, 
         created in the form of an agency authority, 
         but held for the benefit of the power holder 
         or a third person and given to secure the 
         performance of a duty or to protect a title, 
         either legal or equitable, such power being 
         given when the duty or title is created or 
         given for consideration. 
         Comment (b) to section 138 of the Restatement explains 
that "[a] power given as security is one held for the benefit of 
a person other than the power giver [i.e. principal]."  A 
principal can terminate an agency power given as security "only 
in accordance with the agreement by which the power was created."  
Id. § 139 cmt. a.  On the other hand, the power giver can revoke 
the power if it was created only for the benefit of the power 
giver, i.e., when there is a simple agency relationship.  If the 
agent has an interest in the exercise of the power only because 
of the compensation to which it is entitled upon its exercise, 
then the power is not given as security and is revocable. 
         A principal may grant an irrevocable agency power for 
the purpose either of furnishing a security to protect a debt or 
other duty, or facilitating the performance, effectuating the 
objects, or securing the benefits of a contract.  See id. § 138 
cmt. c.  For example, a power given as security arises when a 
person manifests consent that the one to whom it is given 
properly can act to protect a title already in the power holder.  
Id. cmt. a.  Moreover, if an agent has an interest in the subject 
matter of the agency, as where it engages in a joint enterprise 
or invests in a business in which another supplies the subject 
matter, a power given it by the other to protect such interest is 
a power given as a security.  See id. cmt. b.; see also Bowling 
v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., 135 So. 541, 543-44 (Fla. 
1931); Haft v. Haft, 671 A.2d 413, 422-23 (Del. Ch. 1995).  In 
any of these circumstances, a power given as a security cannot be 
terminated at the whim of the power giver.  See Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 14H cmt. a. 
         The Restatement provides illustrations of a power given 
to protect the property interest of the power holder (i.e., the 
agent) in the subject matter of the agency, as well as a power 
given to secure a duty or obligation owed to the agent.  While 
the illustrations focus on the protected interest as held by the 
agent or power holder, it is clear that the agency is also 
irrevocable if made for the benefit of a third person, although 
the agency can be terminated with the consent of the third-party 
beneficiary.  Moreover, agency powers granted both for the 
benefit of the principal and the agent are irrevocable.  SeeRestatement 
(Second) of Agency § 138 cmt. d ("A person authorized 
to act as agent may also hold a power for his own benefit."). 
         An indispensable feature of a power given as security 
is that the agent have a proprietary interest in the res or 
subject matter of the agency independent of the agency 
relationship itself.  As the district court noted, Professor 
Williston's comments on this subject are instructive: 
              In order that a power may be irrevocable 
         because it is coupled with an interest, it is 
         necessary that the interest be in the subject 
         matter of the power and not in the proceeds 
         which will arise from the exercise of the 
         power . . . . 
 
         . . . [T]he person clothed with the authority 
         must derive a present or future interest in 
         the subject itself on which the power is to 
         be exercised . . . . In short, the test is: 
 
              Does the agent have an interest or 
         estate in the subject matter of the agency 
         independent of the power conferred, or does 
         the interest or estate accrue by or after the 
         exercise of the power conferred? 
 
              If the former, it is an agency coupled 
         with an interest . . . if the latter, it is 
         not. 
Government Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 166 F.R.D. at 327-28, 
(quoting 2 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 
280, at 300-02 (3d ed. 1959)).  Thus, in the words of the 
district court, "the agency relationship itself does not create 
the interest; the agency merely serves to protect the separately 
granted or created interest when the two are coupled."  Id. at 
328. 
               2.  The District Court's Disposition 
         In its memorandum of January 8, 1996, granting 35 
Acres' motion to dismiss Hyatt's complaint in Civil No. 1995-68, 
the district court indicated that, "[f]or Hyatt to claim that its 
agency authority is . . . a power given as security, it must have 
alleged that the agreements were entered into for [its] benefit . 
. . either to protect a property interest of Hyatt's in the hotel 
or to secure the performance of some duty or obligation owed to 
Hyatt."  Government Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 1996 WL 
165008, at *3.  Because Hyatt failed to allege such an interest, 
the district court dismissed count one of Hyatt's second amended 
complaint at that time.  Id.  The court thereafter held that any 
agency under the management agreement was revocable and had been 
terminated.  Id. 
         In its January 8, 1996 memorandum the district court 
first noted that Hyatt's own pleadings established that 35 Acres 
had terminated the agency: 
         Hyatt concedes that 35 Acres sent it letters 
         that 35 Acres 'considered Hyatt's management 
         agreement "void, terminated and/or expired"' 
         and demanding Hyatt `immediately surrender 
         possession' of the Hotel.  (Second Amended 
         Complaint at 2.)  Indisputably, such letters 
         manifested 35 Acres' dissent to the 
         continuance of the agency relationship with 
         Hyatt -- all that is required for an agency 
         to be terminated under the Restatement.  
         Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 118. 
Id..  The court held that Hyatt could not continue to manage the 
hotel: 
         Thus, assuming all the facts alleged in the 
         complaint are true, the relationship between 
         Hyatt and 35 Acres is a simple agency; and 
         Hyatt has not demonstrated any legal basis 
         for a declaration that the agency has not 
         been terminated or that Hyatt may continue as 
         manager of the hotel. 
Id.. 
         The district court noted that it had considered Hyatt's 
contentions that the management agreement created an irrevocable 
agency coupled with an interest:  "Hyatt wants to argue that the 
management agreements constitute an agency coupled with an 
interest which cannot be summarily revoked."  Id.  The court 
held, however, that Hyatt failed to present any basis for such a 
conclusion: 
         In its second amended complaint, Hyatt has 
         alleged no property interest in the hotel; 
         nor has Hyatt alleged that the authority was 
         granted to secure the performance of any duty 
         owed to it.  Hyatt's only asserted interest 
         is in the compensation due it as manager of 
         the hotel, the benefit to its reputation, and 
         an enhanced presence in the Caribbean.  Such 
         interests are ordinary incidents of an agency 
         relationship and standing alone do not 
         support an inference that the agreements were 
         entered into for the benefit of Hyatt as 
         opposed to the benefit of the owner.  In sum, 
         Hyatt simply does not allege any interest in 
         the hotel aside from its interest in reaping 
         the benefits from acting as 35 Acres' agent. 
Id. 
         Moreover, the district court noted that the management 
agreement did not even recite that it created an agency coupled 
with an interest.  Id. at *3 n.7.  The court concluded that: 
"Whether or not Hyatt breached the agreements does not change the 
reality that under the facts alleged by Hyatt, the agency 
relationship has terminated and Hyatt cannot continue acting as 
manager of the Hotel."  Id. at *4. 
         Later, at the hearing on March 6, 1996, the district 
court addressed 35 Acres' motion for partial summary judgment, 
the grant of which led to this appeal.  At the conclusion of that 
hearing the court stated as follows: 
         I do not see any basis for changing the 
         Court's previous ruling.  I haven't heard 
         anything and I don't, haven't seen anything 
         in Hyatt's proposed amended complaint that 
         when it's read together with the management 
         agreement and the other facts that are 
         undisputed in this case -- and those are 
         basically as 35 Acres has stated, that they 
         own the property, that Hyatt has no title 
         ownership, no right of possession as a result 
         of any ownership.  It is an agent of 35 Acres 
         only.  The management agreement was the only 
         instrument which gives them the right to be 
         there and I don't see any reason to go 
         outside the four corners of the management 
         agreement.  It's whatever the negotiations, 
         whatever the intentions were, whatever the 
         desires were, whoever came up first to me is 
         not, does not help to explain anything in the 
         management agreement. 
 
         . . . .  
 
         So, I will, say, reduce that to a written 
         order as soon as possible.  I would suggest 
         that counsel get together and you work out 
         whatever is necessary to be able to have 
         Hyatt leave the premises in terms of any 
         items that Mr. Cole mentioned, so that order 
         won't be imposed on Hyatt; it will simply be 
         an agreed-upon to the extent they can agree 
         upon it and maybe if you can get together 
         with Judge Barnard.  And if you can't resolve 
         it, I'll resolve it. 
 
         . . . And it should be done within good -- 
         from Hyatt.  If you don't want to do that, 
         then you will have to do it the hard way.  
         But I certainly think it would be in your 
         interest to do it cooperatively.  So, that is 
         the Court's ruling. 
App. at 2155-57. 
         In its April 10, 1996 opinion the district court issued 
a written confirmation of its March 6, 1996 rulings.  The court 
referenced decisions that have held as a matter of law that chain 
hotel management contracts create a typical revocable agency, not 
an irrevocable agency coupled with an interest.  Government 
Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 166 F.R.D. at 329-30 (citing 
Pacific Landmark Hotel, Ltd. v. Marriott Hotels, Inc., 23 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Woolley v. Embassy Suites, 
Inc., 278 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)).  Further, the 
court addressed Hyatt's argument that the management agreement 
created some sort of "joint enterprise" between itself and the 
prior owner of the hotel: 
         Hyatt's claim of some sort of joint 
         ventureship or enterprise is foreclosed by 
         the unambiguous language of that document.  
         Section 3.8 of the Management Agreement 
         provides: 
 
              Nothing in this Agreement contained 
              shall constitute, or be construed 
              to create, a partnership, joint 
              venture or lease between Owner and 
              Hyatt with respect to the Hotel. 
166 F.R.D. at 328. 
         The court noted that the management agreement could not 
be construed as creating a new business entity because, even if 
Hyatt's management fee was construed as a share of the profits, 
Hyatt never undertook to share in the losses of any such 
enterprise:  "In fact, the Management Agreement was structured so 
that Hyatt would receive a management fee even when the Hotel 
suffered a loss."  Id. 
         The court also considered Hyatt's argument that the 
management agreement created a power given as security to protect 
its intellectual property, which was to be used by Hyatt in 
carrying out its duties on behalf of the owner.  The court held 
that Hyatt's contentions regarding protecting its reputation and 
its trade name did not warrant a result any different from that 
in prior cases concerning chain hotel management contracts that 
created revocable agencies.  Id. at 329 & n.21 (citing Pacific 
Landmark Hotel, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555; Woolley v. Embassy Suites, 
278 Cal. Rptr. 719).  Thus, the court held that: 
              The plain language of the Management 
         Agreement shows, and the undisputed facts of 
         this case definitively establish, that the 
         agency was created for the benefit of the 
         owner, not Hyatt, and that Hyatt's sole 
         interest in the Management Agreement is its 
         right to compensation.  As such, the 
         Management Agreement was a personal services 
         contract which cannot be specifically 
         enforced.  Restatement of the Law (Second) 
         Contracts, § 367(1) (1981). 
166 F.R.D. at 329. 
         In explaining why it would be inappropriate to order 
specific performance of the management agreement, the district 
court found the rationale stated in Woolley v. Embassy Suitesconvincing: 
              There are a variety of reasons why 
         courts are loathe to order specific 
         performance of personal services contracts.  
         Such an order would impose upon the court the 
         prodigious if not impossible task of passing 
         judgment on the quality of performance.  It 
         would also run contrary to the Thirteenth 
         Amendment's prohibition against involuntary 
         servitude.  Courts wish to avoid the friction 
         and social costs which result when the 
         parties are reunited in a relationship that 
         has already failed, especially where the 
         services involve mutual confidence and the 
         exercise of discretionary authority.  
         Finally, it is impractical to require 
         judicial oversight of a contract which calls 
         for special knowledge, skill, or ability. 
Id. at 329-30 (quoting Woolley v. Embassy Suites, 278 Cal. Rptr. 
at 727). 
                 3.  Hyatt's Arguments on Appeal 
         For the most part, Hyatt's arguments on appeal are the 
same as those it made in the district court.  As we agree both 
with that court's decision and its reasoning, we only need 
discuss the specifics of arguments not addressed by the district 
court. 
         Hyatt argues that it presented competent evidence to 
the district court that demonstrated the irrevocability of its 
agency agreement with Great Cruz.  Specifically, Hyatt asserts 
that its agency "exceeds the mere management of physical property 
and extends to the operation of a comprehensive and complex 
business" that is reflected in the scope of its rights under the 
management agreement.  Br. at 36.  Thus, the subject matter of 
Hyatt's agency is "not limited to the real and personal property 
of the Resort, but includes the operation of the business of the 
Resort."  Id. at 37. 
         Hyatt relies on decisions of courts that have held that 
an irrevocable agency is created where "an agent makes a 
substantial contribution to or capital investment in a business 
enterprise while assuming significant managerial responsibilities 
over that business."  Br. at 38 (citing Bowling v. National 
Convoy & Trucking Co., 135 So. at 543; Haft v. Haft, 671 A.2d at 
423); Montgomery v. Foreman, 410 So.2d 1160, 1167-68 (La. Ct. 
App. 1982); MacDonald v. Rosenfeld, 188 P.2d 519, 521, 528 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1948); Jones v. Williams, 39 S.W. 486, 493-94 (Mo. 
1897)).  Hyatt claims that it submitted overwhelming evidence in 
the district court of its agreement with Great Cruz to use the 
real property and improvements thereon to create a new business 
enterprise, the "Hyatt Regency St. John."  Hyatt claims that it 
was the catalyst in establishing that business, and that: 
         Its capital contributions and investments to 
         the business included lending the use of its 
         registered trademarks and service marks; 
         providing proprietary and confidential 
         information, programs, and systems with 
         respect to sales, marketing, and operations; 
         and making the resort an integral member of 
         the `Hyatt' worldwide chain of hotels and 
         resorts. 
Br. at 38.  Hyatt also claims that "to protect and secure its 
economic interests in the new business, Hyatt assumed control of 
the management of that business as well as the day-to-day 
operations, and thereby was invested with certain powers of 
agency."  Id. at 39.  According to Hyatt, those powers were 
granted for its benefit and, thus, are irrevocable. 
         Like the district court, we decline to accept Hyatt's 
theory that it has "proven the creation of a resort business and 
its contributions to and investments in that business, its 
profits interests therein, and its insistence upon and receipt of 
managerial powers to protect those contributions, investments, 
and interests," br. at 38 n.9, in the face of the clear language 
in the management agreement that: 
              Nothing in this Agreement contained 
         shall constitute, or be construed to be or to 
         create, a partnership, joint venture or lease 
         between Owner and Hyatt with respect to the 
         Hotel. 
Management agreement, § 3.8; app. at 1828.  Moreover, none of the 
cases Hyatt cites to support its argument are aligned factually  
with this case.  See, e.g., MacDonald v. Rosenfeld, 188 P.2d at 
528 ("The evidence supports the view that defendant was granted 
`a power coupled with an interest' in that he was given the 
management of the business as security for the loans he had 
made."); Jones v. Williams, 39 S.W. at 493 ("Under the contract, 
plaintiff purchased 1,667 shares of stock in the corporation, for 
which he paid $80,000; and, in consideration thereof, he was to 
have the `control and management' of the Post Dispatch for five 
years, at an annual salary of $10,000."); Bowling v. National 
Convoy & Trucking Co., 135 So. at 543 (affirming holding that 
agency was coupled with interest in business founded by agent); 
Montgomery v. Foreman, 410 So.2d at 1167 ("Thus it was 
contemplated that [the agent] would recoup the monies he spent in 
improving the property[.]"); Haft v. Haft, 671 A.2d at 423 
(irrevocable stock voting proxy given as security for note and 
other interests retained in corporation as well as security for 
payment of purchase price of transfer of stock at issue).  Thus, 
we reject as a matter of law Hyatt's argument that it possessed 
an irrevocable agency due to its part in the creation of a new 
business enterprise.  Hyatt has raised no genuine issue of 
material fact that alters our conclusion. 
         Hyatt next argues that its contribution of its 
trademarks and trade names, chain services, and management 
expertise was and is "an integral and valuable part of the 
business known as the `Hyatt Regency St. John.'"  Br. at 41.  
Hyatt claims that the combination of those contributions created 
and continue to add value to the goodwill of the business, and 
that the goodwill in turn is a major factor in the ability and 
capacity of the hotel to generate profits.  Hyatt claims that to 
secure and protect those investments, it negotiated and acquired 
rights to manage the business.  Therefore, Hyatt asserts that the 
relationship created by the agreements among the parties was an 
irrevocable agency which 35 Acres could not terminate except in 
accordance with the express termination provisions set forth in 
the parties' agreements. 
         As a matter of law, we agree with the district court 
that Hyatt's contribution of its trademarks and trade names, 
chain services, and management expertise to the hotel was merely 
a normal incident of an agency relationship, and did not create 
an irrevocable agency.  Again, Hyatt has raised no genuine issue 
of material fact to alter our conclusion. 
         Hyatt next attempts to distinguish the two decisions of 
the California Court of Appeals on which the district court 
relied in ruling that Hyatt's agency is revocable.  First, Hyatt 
explains that, in Woolley v. Embassy Suites, "Embassy Suites had 
a license agreement which was separate from and independent of 
its management agreement and, therefore, it could not 
successfully argue that the managerial powers were given to it in 
order to protect and secure its intellectual property, which was 
the subject of the separate license agreement."  Br. at 42.  SeeWoolley, 
278 Cal. Rptr. at 726 ("Embassy says that this agency is 
different because the hotels are franchised with the Embassy name 
and that it therefore has its own interest in their success.  But 
the franchise agreements are severable and independent from the 
management contracts[.]"). 
         Next, Hyatt attempts to distinguish Pacific Landmark 
Hotel by stating that in that case an irrevocable agency would 
have existed had there been a legal identity between the Marriott 
entity that managed the hotel and the Marriott entity that held 
an interest in the hotel business.  Since that was not the case, 
Hyatt states that the legal separateness between the two was the 
sole factor in the court's refusal to find an irrevocable agency.  
Br. at 42; see Pacific Landmark Hotel, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 563 
("[T]he trial court was disregarding the separate corporate 
entities . . . when it found MHI had an interest in the subject 
of the agency. . . . [T]he trial court erred in failing to treat 
MHI as separate from its parent corporation Marriott."). 
         Hyatt argues that the facts in this case are materially 
different from those in Woolley v. Embassy Suites and in Pacific 
Landmark Hotel.  Hyatt asserts that it permitted its intellectual 
property (including its registered trademarks and trade names) to 
be used in connection with the hotel only because it insisted 
upon and received agency powers to manage the resort.  Moreover, 
the entity that owns the "Hyatt" and "Hyatt Regency" trademarks 
and trade names and that holds an interest in the resort business 
known as the "Hyatt Regency St. John" is the same entity that 
obtained for its benefit the right to manage the resort -- 
namely, Hyatt Corporation.  Hyatt thus claims that the two 
California cases are distinguishable.   
         We do not agree with Hyatt's reading of the two 
California cases.  While it is true that the specific facts of 
the cases differ from the case before us, their legal holdings 
are instructive here.  In Pacific Landmark Hotel even though a 
Marriott affiliate had invested loans of $15 million and $8 
million in capital contributions, pursuant to which the affiliate 
received a five percent ownership interest in the limited 
partnerships that owned the real estate and 95-99% of the tax 
benefits of those partnerships, the court held as a matter of law 
that the management agreements did not create an agency with an 
interest in favor of Marriott Hotels, Inc., which was the 
manager.  23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557, 560-63. 
         Moreover, even though Marriott's management contracts 
provided for Marriott Hotels, Inc. to receive 30% of available 
cash flow for 60 years as part of its management fee and 
presumably Marriott, like Hyatt, contracted to use its trade name 
and trademarks in providing its management services, the court 
held as a matter of law that the relationship was not an 
irrevocable agency.  23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557, 562-63.  Given 
provisions that unambiguously provided that the agreements were 
between principal and agent and did not create a lease, 
partnership or joint venture, as a matter of law the agency could 
be terminated.  Id. at 560-63.  The court held that the absence 
of a specific present property interest was dispositive. 
         In addition, the dispute in Woolley v. Embassy Suitesinvolved 
termination of Embassy Suites' management of nine hotels 
that were under management contract, not termination of a 
franchise or license agreement.  278 Cal. Rptr. at 721 & n.1.  
Like Hyatt, Embassy Suites argued that the court should ignore 
the express contractual provisions negating any partnership or 
joint venture, but the court found those provisions dispositive.  
Id. at 724-26.  Embassy Suites, like Hyatt, argued that the use 
of its trade name turned the management agreements into an agency 
with an interest, and the court rejected those contentions for 
the lack of any specific present property interest.  Id. at 726.  
The district court accurately analyzed the effect of the case: 
         Like Hyatt, the defendant in Woolley v. 
         Embassy Suites, Inc., 278 Cal. Rptr. 719 
         (Cal. App. 1991), argued that its interest in 
         the success and prestige of its trade name 
         was sufficient to create an irrevocable 
         agency.  The Court squarely rejected that 
         claim, noting that `the "interest" Embassy 
         has in seeing the hotels succeed so as to 
         enhance its reputation and prestige is not 
         the type of . . . interest necessary to 
         constitute an agency coupled with an 
         interest.'  Id. at 726.  Hyatt attempts to 
         distinguish Woolley by pointing to the fact 
         that the use of the Embassy Suites trade name 
         in that case was secured by a separate 
         franchise agreement.  In our view, this fact 
         militates against the presence of an 
         irrevocable agency here.  If the use of 
         Hyatt's intellectual property were protected 
         by a franchise agreement then the Owner 
         potentially could use Hyatt's trademarks and 
         trade names even after the agency ended.  
         Arguably, a separate clause linking the 
         franchise agreement to the agency 
         relationship might be needed to protect the 
         agent's interest.  Here, termination of the 
         Management Agreement cancels the owner's 
         right to use Hyatt's intellectual property. 
Government Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 166 F.R.D. at 329 n.21. 
         In short, we agree with the district court that the two 
California cases are instructive in this case and that, as a 
matter of law, Hyatt's interest in protecting its trademarks and 
service specialties is not sufficient to form an irrevocable 
agency.  Hyatt has raised no genuine issue of material fact to 
alter our decision. 
         Hyatt next claims that it has raised genuine issues of 
disputed fact with regard to the "effectiveness of 35 Acres' 
purported termination letter of March 21, 1995."  Br. at 43.  As 
we already have indicated the district court noted that:  
         Hyatt concedes that 35 Acres sent it letters 
         that 35 Acres `considered Hyatt's management 
         agreement "void, terminated and/or expired"' 
         and demanding Hyatt `immediately surrender 
         possession' of the Hotel.  (Second Amended 
         Complaint at 2.)  Indisputably, such letters 
         manifested 35 Acres' dissent to the 
         continuance of the agency relationship with 
         Hyatt -- all that is required for an agency 
         to be terminated under the Restatement.  
         Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 118. 
Government Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 1996 WL 165008, at *3.  
We find here no genuine issue of material fact to alter our 
decision. 
         Hyatt finally claims that 35 Acres materially breached 
and wrongfully repudiated the management agreement by purporting 
to terminate Hyatt.  "The only proof in the summary judgment 
record showed that Hyatt complied fully with its obligations."  
Br. at 45.  Hyatt claims that it therefore has submitted 
competent evidence supporting affirmative defenses.  In light of 
our decision that Hyatt's agency was revocable, we find this 
argument meritless. 
         One final issue with respect to termination of Hyatt's 
management agreement deserves our attention.  It is true that a 
subordination, non-disturbance, and attornment agreement set 
forth the rights of the parties should Skopbank foreclose its 
mortgage from Great Cruz, including a warrant by Skopbank that 
the management agreement would remain undisturbed by any 
foreclosure or default and would continue in full force and 
effect as long as Hyatt was not in default.   (Subordination 
Agreement at §§ 2, 3; app. at 548).  Hyatt's seeking of this 
subordination agreement indicates impressive foresight on its 
part; indeed, the subordination agreement even could be construed 
to indicate intent among the parties that the management 
agreement itself be irrevocable.   
         However, as noted by the district court, "management 
agreements between the owner of a hotel and a managing 
corporation do not create an agency coupled with an interest, 
even if the agreements state that they do."  Government Guarantee 
Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 1996 WL 165008 at *3 n.7 (citing Woolley v. 
Embassy Suites, 278 Cal. Rptr. 719; Pacific Landmark Hotel, 23 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 555.  Surely, if agreements that by their terms are 
irrevocable, thus manifesting the parties' intent that they be 
so, are not necessarily irrevocable, intent manifested by the 
separate creation of a subordination agreement does not create a 
power coupled with an interest.  Thus, while the subordination 
agreement may be very significant in a determination of whether 
35 Acres wrongfully terminated Hyatt's management agreement, it 
does not affect our result here.  Whether or not an agency 
agreement is revocable is a matter of law.  See Pacific Landmark 
Hotel, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 561 ("[E]ven if the parties intended 
to create an irrevocable agency, one coupled with an interest, 
unless they do so and such an interest does in fact exist, the 
statutory power to revoke may be exercised.  If the exercise of 
the statutory revocation power is contractually unjustified, 
damages may be in order."); Woolley v. Embassy Suites, 278 Cal. 
Rptr. at 725 ("Even if the contract did attempt to restrict the 
power of the owner to terminate the manager, such provision would 
be ineffective.  The principal's power of revocation is absolute 
and applies even if doing so is a violation of the contract or 
the agency is characterized as `irrevocable.'") (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 118 cmt. b). 
         Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's grant 
of 35 Acres' motion for partial summary judgment, since Hyatt has 
raised no genuine issue of material fact and 35 Acres is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of the management 
agreement's revocability. 
            D.  Remedies Granted by the District Court 
         Hyatt's next argument is that the district court erred 
in granting 35 Acres relief and imposing obligations on Hyatt 
that neither were requested by 35 Acres nor supported in the 
summary judgment record.  We review issues regarding the relief 
fashioned by the district court for abuse of discretion only.  
See United States v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 857 F.2d 579, 583 
(9th Cir. 1988) (affirming district court's grant of partial 
summary judgment and permanent injunction enjoining former 
lessees from remaining on property); see generally McLendon v. 
Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir. 1990). 
         Hyatt notes that paragraph 3 of the district court's 
order of May 3, 1996, requires it, among other things, to turn 
over to 35 Acres: keys, alarm access codes, key cards, other 
means of access and egress thereto, books, records, 
correspondence, documents, computer and electronically-maintained 
records, reservations information, furniture, fixtures, 
equipment, vehicles, documents of title and receipts, cash, 
coupons, instruments for the payment of money, certificates of 
deposit, accounts receivable, contract rights, intangible 
personal property, and all other personal property relating to 
the operation of the resort.  Br. at 45.  Hyatt argues that 35 
Acres did not satisfy the burden imposed upon parties seeking 
mandatory injunctive relief, and that this portion of the 
district court's judgment should be reversed. 
         Further, Hyatt notes that in paragraph 5 of the May 3, 
1996 order, the district court ordered that: 
         Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 70, 35 Acres 
         Associates shall be entitled to All Writs 
         which may be necessary to effectuate the 
         foregoing, whether by Ejectment, Abatement, 
         Assistance, Sequestration, Execution, 
         Garnishment, or otherwise, and the Clerk 
         shall issue the same, as necessary, without 
         further order of this Court. 
Hyatt argues that Rule 70 does not authorize the plethora of 
extraordinary personal property remedies that the district court 
granted to 35 Acres, and that we therefore should reverse this 
portion of the judgment. 
         Finally, Hyatt notes that paragraph 3(h) of the May 
3, 1996 order provides that "Hyatt Corporation may not remove any 
personal property from the Hotel Property other than items of 
personal property belonging to individual employees of Hyatt 
Corporation."  Br. at 46 (citing app. at 2340).  Noting that, in 
paragraph 4, the district court did permit Hyatt to segregate, 
seal, and/or designate its privileged documents, proprietary 
commercial materials, and personal property located on the resort 
premises, but effectively prohibited Hyatt from removing its 
property except "in accordance with further Order of this Court," 
app. at 2341-42, Hyatt argues that nothing in the summary 
judgment record justifies a court order interfering with or 
depriving Hyatt of its rights of use, enjoyment, and possession 
of its own property.  Hyatt therefore argues that this portion of 
the district court's judgment should be reversed. 
         After a thorough review of the record, we see nothing 
in the relief fashioned by the district court that we could term 
an abuse of that court's discretion.  Obviously the termination 
of Hyatt's presence in the hotel raised fairly complex practical 
problems, and we will not fault the district court for 
effectuating the transition in a common sense way.  Therefore, we 
will affirm in its entirety the judgment of the district court. 
                       E.  Attorney's Fees 
         Hyatt's final issue is a challenge to the district 
court's statement in the memorandum accompanying its May 3, 1996 
order, that, because of "Hyatt's stubborn refusal to vacate the 
premises," Hyatt would "bear any costs and attorney's fees 
incurred by 35 Acres related to its efforts in securing [the May 
3, 1996 order]."  Government Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., No. 
1995-49, slip op. at 3 (D.V.I. May 3, 1996).  Hyatt argues that 
the district court imposed these "sanctions" for the first time 
in its memorandum without any notice or hearing, implicating 
fundamental notions of due process.  Moreover, Hyatt argues that 
because the district court did not identify the rule or statute 
under which it imposed these "sanctions," it is impossible for an 
appellate court to determine if the court applied the correct 
standard.  Accordingly, Hyatt argues that we should reverse the 
district court's award of "sanctions" against Hyatt. 
         The law is clear that awards of costs and attorneys' 
fees are not appealable until the court determines their amount.  
See, e.g., Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 27 F.3d 931, 
935 (3d Cir. 1994); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 983 
F.2d 1267, 1276-77 (3d Cir. 1993).  Consequently inasmuch as the 
district court has not quantified the fees and costs there is no 
order with respect to them that is final for the purpose of 
appellate review.  Therefore, Hyatt's challenge to the district 
court's statement in its memorandum regarding the bearing of 
costs and attorneys' fees is premature.  Accordingly, we will 
dismiss this part of the appeal for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction. 
                        IV.  CONCLUSION 
         For all the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
district court's order of April 10, 1996, granting 35 Acres' 
motion for partial summary judgment in its entirety and the order 
of May 3, 1996, providing for the transition of management and 
will dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction the part of 
Hyatt's appeal relating to attorneys' fees and costs.  We vacate 
the stay in our order of May 20, 1996.  Finally, we will remand 
the case to the district court for further proceedings on the  
remaing aspect of the case. 
 
